Willard Van Orman Quine - Two Dogmas of Empiricism - The problem of analytical and synthetic statements (synonymy and analyticity)

GENERAL OUTLINE OF "TWO Dogmas of Empiricism"

In Two Dogmas of Empiricism Quine presents at first the problem as the division that is usually made between synthetic and analytic propositions. For him, there are no boundaries between analytic and synthetic statements.

The difference between meaning and name


x name meaning

                         
                               <Concretes
Singular terms <
                               <Abstract


The Singular terms are those that name the entities

Term = General Predicate

The General Terms are the truth about the entity

There is therefore a difference between the meaning of the singular term and a named entity.
Also, the meaning of a general term is different from your extension.

Quine addresses the issue of "be contained in" concepts

MEANING

What is the meaning?

We can understand that a first feature of significance is that it is not a name.
Hence, "the meaning is that it becomes the essence when it is divorced from the reference object and joins the word."

Meaning Theory x Reference Theory

In this sense, the meaning is closer to the floor than to the reference object, the same object.
From this it follows that for the study theory of the significance is necessary to understand two modes:

                   <Synonymy (occurs replacement by synonyms)
meaning <
                   <analyticity

Quine claims that a logical truth "is a statement that is true and remains true in all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles."

                                     <Logically true (ex .: no unmarried man is married)
Analytic statements <
                                     <Synonymy (eg .: No bachelor is married)


Thus, the challenge raised by Quine in this writing is what relates to analyticity under synonymy therefore generally said that analytic statements of the second class (synonyms) are mere explanations of the first class (logical truths).


The Definition of the Problem

The first problem of synonymy is placed as the issue of definition, since the analytic statements of the second class, namely the synonymic, reduce to define or seek to explain the logical truths, such as "single" (logical truth ) and "unmarried man" (synonym). With it, Quine raises the question of the origin of the definition of what comprises the lexcógrafo function to base its records with the usual sense of the language, that is, according to the behavior and linguistic dynamics.

Quine concludes that although we do not know what is the reason of having synonyms, they are based on interconnections based on usage.

Consequently Quine reminds negatively the question of explanation raised by Carnap, where it occurs, to explain an extension of the sense of the definition, no longer as mere synonym of the first utterances, but a refinement of meaning. For to Quine, although there is not a direct synonymy, the explanation just by borrowing other synonyms.

Quine concludes that the definition does not solve the problem of synonymy.


The Problem of Intersubstituitibilidade


Point 3 addresses the issue of intersubstitutibilidade when two linguistic forms are intersubstituem whatever the context. The Quine this perspective also terce criticism and counter-claims saying that not in all contexts can substitute a synonym for another.