segunda-feira, 7 de novembro de 2016
Opressão e Opressores: Qual o Fundamento da Dominação?
A opressão ocorre porque os opressores oprimem ou os opressores oprimem por conta da opressão? Com isso, qual é o fundamento da dominação? A opressão aí no mundo ou a vontade de controle de quem controla? Se o controlado e oprimido é maioria, porquê o senso de conformidade aos fins dos dominadores? Me parece que, ontologicamente, o conceito de opressão em seu fundamento é contradição necessária à ordem.
Deste modo, a esperança política é sempre negativa justamente porque sempre se espera ao passo que, contrariamente a isso, pode, positivamente entender-se tal esperança enquanto ideal, ou seja, algo que ainda não é, mas que pode tornar-se um dia. Portanto, a positividade da esperança política se mostra em sua possibilidade idealizada, porém, impossível na experiência dada.
De modo que "oprimir" é o nome da ação realizada por aquele quem a pratica, mas o substantivo feminino "opressão", o que é? Logo, a pergunta que faço é: a coisa substantivada é originada pela ação realizada pelo querer do individuo ou há uma opressão metafísica que proporciona as ações? O que é, pois, a opressão? Será que quem oprime também não está sendo oprimido para oprimir?
Se capturarmos como base exemplificadora disso a noção idearia de "aura da arte" a qual se reportava Walter Benjamin, podemos compreender, se aqui aplicarmos ao produzente da ação, a saber, seu substantivo,que este substantivo é o ser da ação, logo, sua aura.
Se a aura é a pureza e singularidade da arte, o conceito "opressão" é a essência do conceito de "oprimir", isto é, um principio que a revela, um fundamento primeiro desse agir.
Assim, ou se admite que a ação no agente se produz quando este age ou este age por um princípio que o norteia, esteja tal principio no campo objetivo ou mesmo subjetivo, ou, talvez, no anti-espaço-tempo.
Estou falando do ser da ação, sua aura, seu substantivo. Ora, nos parece que é a ação propriedade de seu substantivo, ou seria o inverso? O ser da ação é o objeto de nossa atenção de agora em diante.
terça-feira, 19 de julho de 2016
segunda-feira, 18 de julho de 2016
Harry Potter e Albus Dumbledore filosofando no último filme da saga
Harry e Dumbledore, em poucas frases traçam um dos diálogos mais filosóficos do cinema, puro idealismo subjetivo.
quinta-feira, 14 de julho de 2016
Filosofia e Prática
A filosofia não deveria se preocupar com nada prático. Pois, a prática está saturada de senso comum.
Se a filosofia conseguir discursar acerca de uma prática totalmente despida das confusões do senso comum, então poderá, talvez, ter algum êxito em sua abordagem.
quarta-feira, 29 de junho de 2016
terça-feira, 28 de junho de 2016
segunda-feira, 27 de junho de 2016
sábado, 25 de junho de 2016
Kant and Christianity
Kant and Christianity
A considerable and laudatory comment about Christianity is discoursed by Kant in the pamphlet The End of All Things, where our philosopher says that this religious following has even itself something worthy of love.
Kant not only approach the Christianity of the claims of the law, as reinterpreted in the light of his moral doctrine with regard to the aspirations of the law as to what is prescribed for reward purposes or punishment data as necessary compliances retributive the actions of rational beings .
sexta-feira, 24 de junho de 2016
Kant e o Cristianismo
Kant e o Cristianismo
Um
considerável e elogioso comentário sobre o cristianismo é discorrido por Kant
no opúsculo O Fim de Todas as Coisas,
onde nosso filósofo afirma que este seguimento religioso tem ainda em si algo digno de amor[1].
Kant não só aproxima o cristianismo
das pretensões da lei, como o reinterpreta à luz de sua doutrina moral no que
se refere às aspirações da lei, quanto ao que esta prescreve para fins de
recompensa ou punição dados como conformidades necessárias retributivas às
ações dos seres racionais.
sexta-feira, 17 de junho de 2016
Kant e os milagres
Kant e os milagres
Em suma, Kant define
milagre como um termo aplicado aos acontecimentos
no mundo de cuja causa nos sãos e hão-de permanecer de todo desconhecidas as
leis de acção (KANT, 1992, p. 92),
isto é, são fatos inexplicáveis, ignorados pelo uso prático da razão[1]. Há,
portanto, leis conhecidas ou conhecíveis à cognição da razão, porém, quando nos
referimos a milagres, estamos contando com leis de todo incompreensíveis para
nós, das quais desconhecemos e devemos continuar as ignorando.
segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2016
Willard Van Orman Quine - Two Dogmas of Empiricism - The problem of analytical and synthetic statements (synonymy and analyticity)
GENERAL OUTLINE OF "TWO Dogmas of Empiricism"
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism Quine presents at first the problem as the division that is usually made between synthetic and analytic propositions. For him, there are no boundaries between analytic and synthetic statements.
The difference between meaning and name
x name meaning
<Concretes
Singular terms <
<Abstract
The Singular terms are those that name the entities
Term = General Predicate
The General Terms are the truth about the entity
There is therefore a difference between the meaning of the singular term and a named entity.
Also, the meaning of a general term is different from your extension.
Quine addresses the issue of "be contained in" concepts
MEANING
What is the meaning?
We can understand that a first feature of significance is that it is not a name.
Hence, "the meaning is that it becomes the essence when it is divorced from the reference object and joins the word."
Meaning Theory x Reference Theory
In this sense, the meaning is closer to the floor than to the reference object, the same object.
From this it follows that for the study theory of the significance is necessary to understand two modes:
<Synonymy (occurs replacement by synonyms)
meaning <
<analyticity
Quine claims that a logical truth "is a statement that is true and remains true in all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles."
<Logically true (ex .: no unmarried man is married)
Analytic statements <
<Synonymy (eg .: No bachelor is married)
Thus, the challenge raised by Quine in this writing is what relates to analyticity under synonymy therefore generally said that analytic statements of the second class (synonyms) are mere explanations of the first class (logical truths).
The Definition of the Problem
The first problem of synonymy is placed as the issue of definition, since the analytic statements of the second class, namely the synonymic, reduce to define or seek to explain the logical truths, such as "single" (logical truth ) and "unmarried man" (synonym). With it, Quine raises the question of the origin of the definition of what comprises the lexcógrafo function to base its records with the usual sense of the language, that is, according to the behavior and linguistic dynamics.
Quine concludes that although we do not know what is the reason of having synonyms, they are based on interconnections based on usage.
Consequently Quine reminds negatively the question of explanation raised by Carnap, where it occurs, to explain an extension of the sense of the definition, no longer as mere synonym of the first utterances, but a refinement of meaning. For to Quine, although there is not a direct synonymy, the explanation just by borrowing other synonyms.
Quine concludes that the definition does not solve the problem of synonymy.
The Problem of Intersubstituitibilidade
Point 3 addresses the issue of intersubstitutibilidade when two linguistic forms are intersubstituem whatever the context. The Quine this perspective also terce criticism and counter-claims saying that not in all contexts can substitute a synonym for another.
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism Quine presents at first the problem as the division that is usually made between synthetic and analytic propositions. For him, there are no boundaries between analytic and synthetic statements.
The difference between meaning and name
x name meaning
<Concretes
Singular terms <
<Abstract
The Singular terms are those that name the entities
Term = General Predicate
The General Terms are the truth about the entity
There is therefore a difference between the meaning of the singular term and a named entity.
Also, the meaning of a general term is different from your extension.
Quine addresses the issue of "be contained in" concepts
MEANING
What is the meaning?
We can understand that a first feature of significance is that it is not a name.
Hence, "the meaning is that it becomes the essence when it is divorced from the reference object and joins the word."
Meaning Theory x Reference Theory
In this sense, the meaning is closer to the floor than to the reference object, the same object.
From this it follows that for the study theory of the significance is necessary to understand two modes:
<Synonymy (occurs replacement by synonyms)
meaning <
<analyticity
Quine claims that a logical truth "is a statement that is true and remains true in all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles."
<Logically true (ex .: no unmarried man is married)
Analytic statements <
<Synonymy (eg .: No bachelor is married)
Thus, the challenge raised by Quine in this writing is what relates to analyticity under synonymy therefore generally said that analytic statements of the second class (synonyms) are mere explanations of the first class (logical truths).
The Definition of the Problem
The first problem of synonymy is placed as the issue of definition, since the analytic statements of the second class, namely the synonymic, reduce to define or seek to explain the logical truths, such as "single" (logical truth ) and "unmarried man" (synonym). With it, Quine raises the question of the origin of the definition of what comprises the lexcógrafo function to base its records with the usual sense of the language, that is, according to the behavior and linguistic dynamics.
Quine concludes that although we do not know what is the reason of having synonyms, they are based on interconnections based on usage.
Consequently Quine reminds negatively the question of explanation raised by Carnap, where it occurs, to explain an extension of the sense of the definition, no longer as mere synonym of the first utterances, but a refinement of meaning. For to Quine, although there is not a direct synonymy, the explanation just by borrowing other synonyms.
Quine concludes that the definition does not solve the problem of synonymy.
The Problem of Intersubstituitibilidade
Point 3 addresses the issue of intersubstitutibilidade when two linguistic forms are intersubstituem whatever the context. The Quine this perspective also terce criticism and counter-claims saying that not in all contexts can substitute a synonym for another.
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Shalom amigos, sou Malka Kotzer diretamente de Israel Gostaria de conversar com vocês hoje sobre o significado da palavra B&...